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FAILURE INVESTIGATION AND RESTORATION  
OF TWO CELLULAR SHEETPILE STRUCTURES  
 
Frank M. Clemente, Jr., Ph.D., P.E. 
AECOM 
20 Exchange Place 






The Trainer - Delco Tap - Mickleton 220-38 kilo-volt transmission lines are carried across the Delaware River by two 332-foot high 
steel latticed towers each founded on a man-made foundation island structure.  Each island structure is comprised of four 
interconnected cellular sheetpile structures.   One island, suffered a severe partial failure due to long-term scour in the Delaware River, 
near Chester, Pennsylvania.  The other island exhibited early symptoms of potential failure, also due to scour.  The client was the 
Philadelphia Electric Company, now known as PECO, acting on behalf of the owner, the Atlantic Electric Company (AECO). 
 
 
The author served as project manager and principal investigator for AECOM (formerly Earth Tech, formerly TAMS).   The paper 
describes the failure investigation, including the structures before and after failure, the original installation (1959-1960), the condition 
survey of each island, condition of the failed sheetpiles, divers’ findings of an underwater survey, hydrographic studies, scour and loss 
of sheetpile embedment. Also described are the subsurface investigation, soils laboratory testing, the soil/rock profile, the probable 
cause(s) of failure, the sequence comprising the failure mechanism, metallurgical findings, circumferential stress analysis and brittle 
failure of the sheetpile panels outside the interlocks. 
 
Remedial measures are described and the design and construction of the selected restoration/stabilization solution via a crushed stone 
buttress is presented.  The author established  the construction sequence and provided technical liaison to PECO during the underwater 
staged construction, which included geo-instrumentation and hydrographic monitoring of an 80,000 cubic yard crushed stone and 
riprap protected circumferential stabilizing buttress, over 50 ft high, placed around the failed island in the Delaware River.  The failure 
investigation, the design and the restorative construction occurred during 1991-1994, yet the lessons learned from this case history are 





On May 7, 1991, PECO authorized AECOM to proceed with a 
failure investigation of two manmade foundation islands 
located in the Delaware River.  The investigation included a 
condition survey, an underwater inspection, a determination of 
the probable cause(s) of the partial collapse of the cellular 
structure of one of the islands, and to propose appropriate 
conceptual design alternatives for restoration of both islands to 
a long-term safe condition.  In order to provide an appropriate 
level of quality assurance to the project, the author 
recommended the engagement of Edwin Paul Swatek, Jr., P.E. 
to review the findings and recommendations of AECOM’s 
draft report and to visit the site with the author. The author 




Description of Structures 
 
The Trainer - Delco Tap - Mickleton 230 kV transmission 
lines cross the Delaware River in the vicinity of Chester, 
Pennsylvania.  The aerial crossing is supported by four lattice-
type towers.  Two 150 ft high anchor towers are founded on 
land and located near the shoreline in Chester, PA and 
Bridgetown, NJ.  Two crossing towers, 332 ft in height, are 
located in the Delaware River.  One tower called the New 
Jersey Tower is approximately 1000 ft from the New Jersey 
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shoreline.  The other tower, called the Pennsylvania tower is 
located approximately 400 ft from the Pennsylvania shoreline.  
The foundation islands for both of these towers were erected 
in 1959-60 to protect the tower foundations from ship and ice 
impact, provide lateral support to the tower foundation H-
piles, create a platform for driving the H-piles and for 
subsequent inspection and maintenance of the tower 
structures.  The islands are constructed of steel sheetpile cells 
filled largely with granular material. Each island has four main 
circular cells, approximately 66-ft in diameter, with 
connecting arcs joined to the cells with riveted 90° tee 
sections. A project location map is shown in Fig. 1 and the 
original layout of the cells is shown in Fig. 2.  Both Cell A and 
Cell B of the New Jersey Island experienced partial collapse 
as outlined in Fig. 3.  On the Pennsylvania Island, Cells A and 
B exhibited early signs of potential failure that if not corrected 
could lead to a collapse similar to the one that had already 
occurred on the New Jersey Island. 
 
 




Fig. 2: Plan and Elevation of New Jersey Island 
 
The exterior sheetpiles, which have one face exposed to the 
river, are US Steel MP-102 sections with ½-inch web 
thickness. The interior sheetpiles, which are backfilled on both 
sides, are MP-101 sections with 3/8- inch web thickness. US 
Steel T2A riveted 90° tee connections were used.  These 
sections conform to ASTM Specification A-328 and are made 
of A36 structural steel with a minimum interlock strength of 




ultimate strength of 70 ksi and a minimum yield point of 39 
ksi. 
 
The crossing towers are supported on 14BP73 steel H-piles 
designed for bearing on rock.  The H-piles were driven 
through the cell fill. Each tower leg pile group has two vertical 
and two batter piles embedded in a concrete pile cap.  The pile 
caps are tied together with concrete grade beams. The cutoff 
elevation of the interior sheetpiles was stepped down to permit 
construction of the grade beams. 





Fig. 3: Before and After Failure 
 
Existing Borings and Soil Profile  
 
Subsurface conditions in the area were determined from a 
series of deep borings drilled to rock. In the vicinity of the 
New Jersey Island the channel depth is about 30 ft.  The top 
stratum is composed of river silt and sand seams extending to 
a depth of about 25 ft.  This is underlain by a sand and gravel 
layer approximately 30-ft thick above a 5 to 15-ft layer of 
decomposed mica schist. Bedrock is mica schist.  A 
subsurface profile in the vicinity of the New Jersey Island is 
shown in Fig. 4. 
 
The subsurface conditions on both islands are similar, except 
the thickness of the silt layer and the depth to the sand and 
gravel layer under the Pennsylvania Island is less than under 
the New Jersey Island. 
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Fig. 4: Idealized Soil and Rock Profile 
 
 
C. Installation  
 
According to the original design construction drawings, the 
sheetpiles were to be driven to the sand and gravel layer.  The 
design called for 80-ft long sheetpiles for the New Jersey cells, 
and 60-ft long sheetpiles for the Pennsylvania cells.  
Sheetpiles were to be driven to either the cut-off elevation or 
to refusal (0.1 inch penetration under a minimum of 7000 ft-lb 
of driving energy), if that occurred first. Because the sheetpile 
driving records are no longer available, the as-built condition 
of the sheetpiles was not known.   
 
The foundation piles for each tower were driven after the 
cellular structure was completed.  These piles were driven to a 
bearing capacity of 90 tons as determined by the Engineering 
News Formula or to refusal on hard rock. 
 
The H-piles were provided with corrosion protection by 
coating them with Tarset, a coal tar epoxy, and with an 
impressed current cathodic protection system, whereas the 






Reports of Failure 
 
In early 1991 PECO performed a routine aerial survey in the 
vicinity of the transmission line crossing.  The surveyors did 
not note any gross changes in the geometry of the New Jersey 
Island.  A pre-existing sinkhole was observed, and it did not 
appear to have enlarged since the previous aerial survey. 
Nevertheless, on Sunday, April 14, 1991, a boater telephoned 
PECO to report that the New Jersey Island appeared damaged. 
PECO personnel visited the island on April 16, 1991 and 
corroborated the damage report.  The two cells facing the 
channel had partially collapsed and leaned out toward the 
river.  Sheetpiles were ruptured and severely distorted.  This 
allowed the fill inside the cells to displace laterally downward, 
exposing two pile caps and the grade beam that connected 
them.  Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 are photographs of the failure. 
 















Review of Existing Information 
 
Existing information on the design, construction and 
performance of the foundation islands was reviewed in the 
preliminary stages of the failure investigation.  Available 
documents relating to the design and construction of the 
islands were received from PECO's archives.  Additional 
survey information for the Delaware River channel was 
provided by the US Army Corps of Engineers and the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.  A 
literature search was conducted to provide information on 
design and construction practices in use at the time the islands 
were built and the performance of similar structures. 
Telephone interviews were conducted with PECO personnel 






A land survey was performed on the New Jersey Island by 
PECO personnel to define the post-failure configuration of the 
fill and exposed portions of the sheetpiling.  The top of fill 
was marked on the inside of the exposed sheetpiles to provide 
a rapid means of evaluating new movements of the fill.  The 
failure surface was established for future monitoring.  A plan 
of the surveyed area is presented in Fig. 3.  A visual inspection 
was made of the sheetpiles, exposed pile caps, grade beam and 
exposed portions of the H-piles. Micrometer readings were 
taken on the exposed portions of the H-piles. Soil samples 
were retrieved from the upper 8 ft of the failure surface for 
sieve analysis and determination of Atterberg limits.  
Ultrasonic thickness measurements of the webs of the 
sheetpiles were taken and the cathodic protection systems on 
both islands were evaluated.  On the Pennsylvania Island a 
sinkhole was measured and the top of fill was marked on the 





Divers performed visual inspections of every sheetpile from 
the low water line to the mudline.  The inspection also 
included the underwater area accessible inside the failed cells. 
The divers noted the general condition of the sheetpiles and 
interlocks and examined areas of potential weakness or 
apparent defects, such as severe pitting, missing or 
deteriorated welds, and lack of embedment of the sheetpiles. 
Samples of soil were retrieved underwater from the mound of 
soil displaced in front of the failure zone for soil mechanics 
analysis.  Ultrasonic thickness measurements were taken at 
selected vertical and horizontal intervals along the cells to 
determine the extent of corrosion of the sheetpiles.  A 
hydrographic survey of the area extending 200 ft beyond each 
island was conducted with the survey data presented in 2-ft 
intervals.  The depths of scour at selected sections around the 
New Jersey Island are shown in Fig. 7.  Scour adjacent to the 
cells was measured by a diver using a pneumo-fathometer. 
 
 
Analysis of Materials 
 
Representatives from PECO's Metallurgy Laboratory and 
AECOM jointly selected coupons from the sheetpiles in the 
failed area for testing and analysis.   A chemical analysis of a 
water sample taken from the ponded water inside the failed 










Simple calculations in accordance with accepted procedures 
were made to estimate earth pressures and corresponding 
tensile stresses in the cellular sheetpile structure as a guide to 





Fig. 7: Depth of Scour 
 
 
REVIEW OF EXISTING INFORMATION 
 
Original Construction Drawings 
 
Existing drawings were obtained from PECO and US 
government agencies.   The drawings were used to prepare a 
geologic profile of the New Jersey Island (Fig. 4) and to 





Documents received from PECO's archives included the 
original specifications for the sheetpiles, H-piles, fill, concrete 
and corrosion protection features and the pile driving records 
for the steel H-piles on the Pennsylvania Island.   The design 
calculations, sheetpile driving records and H-pile driving 
records for the New Jersey Island were no longer available or 
could not be located.  Longtime PECO personnel indicated 
that additional fill had been placed on the islands in the post-






AECOM spoke with PECO personnel who were involved with  
 
 
the construction and maintenance of the two islands.  At the 
time of the interviews in 1991, the events they recalled had 
happened as much as thirty years ago and no written 
documentation of their original observations was available. 
 
The following is a summary of relevant information drawn 
from the oral recollections:  There is some uncertainty about 
the actual slope of the batter H-piles.  The construction 
drawings contain a note indicating that the slope was changed, 
yet a slope of 1:2.5 is shown, which would intersect with the 
lower portion of the sheetpiling.  Additional fill had been 
placed on the New Jersey Island several times since the 
original construction was completed.  Fill had also been added 
periodically to the Pennsylvania Island, but the rate of loss of 
fill and the size of the sinkholes have been less than on the 
New Jersey Island.  The foundation island area was 
predredged on the New Jersey side. Prior to construction soft 
sediments were re-deposited in the dredged area during high 
river stages.  The area was not re-dredged, but excavation of 
the silt from the interior of the cells using a clamshell bucket 
may have been attempted.  It is assumed that this was not 
effective and that soft compressible soils were left in place. 
This would be consistent with the need to periodically refill 
sinkholes at the surface.  About three years after construction, 
divers determined that some of the sheetpiles in the connecting 
arc were not embedded and may not have been interlocked at 
all depths.  At some locations where short sheetpiles should 
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have been butt welded, the sheetpiles did not abut.  Also some 
sheetpiles in Cell B were not embedded and appeared to be 
bearing on random rock outcrops. 
 
 
FINDINGS OF CONDITION SURVEY 
 
A condition survey was performed by AECOM and Lane-
Robinson Associates (LRA), the diving subconsultant. 
Corrosion Probe, Inc. and Hydro Data, Inc. were 
subconsultants to LRA.  The original components of the 
condition survey were an underwater inspection of the islands, 
surface observations and evaluation of the cathodic protection 
system. Additional investigations included hydrographic 
surveys of the perimeter of both islands, a land survey of the 
post-failure configuration of the New Jersey Island and a 
program of metallurgical testing of steel coupons taken from 
the failed cells.  Surface and underwater investigations and the 
metallurgical report are described later.  The condition survey 





LRA performed an underwater inspection of the island          
structures and inspected the exposed surface of the sheetpiles.     
The principal findings of the diver's inspection included the 
general condition of the sheetpiles and H-piles, detection of 
scour, observations related to the failure of the New Jersey 




General Condition of Sheetpiles 
 
Generally, the intact sheetpiles exhibited little loss of section 
and were in good condition.   However, a band of severely 
pitted steel encircles each island at the low water splash zone.  
The pitted band extends from approximate El. -1.0 to -4.0 ft 
USC&G (US Coast and Geodetic Datum).   The pits are as 
much as 1 1/4-inches in diameter, and up to 0.420 inches deep, 
as measured with a pit gauge.  The deeper pits can be 
penetrated with a sharp hammer.  The interlocks in this zone 




Condition of H-Piles 
 
The loss of fill on the New Jersey Island exposed between 1 
and 2 ft of the H-Piles below the pile caps.   The exposed 
portions appeared to be in good condition and the protective 
coating appeared intact, except where it was torn away by the 
movement of the fill.  The flange of one H-pile was bent 
approximately 1 inch out of plane along a 4-inch section.  This 
may have been the result of the pile driving operation that is, 
hard driving to rock. 
 
Detection of Scour 
 
The divers performed a pneumo-fathometer survey around the 
perimeter of the islands at the mudline.   The results of this 
survey were consistent with the precision hydrographic 
survey, and indicated that about 20 ft of scour had occurred on 
the channel side of both islands since original borings were 
conducted in 1959.   Divers observed several 1 to 6-ft vertical 
drops in the mudline profile around both foundation islands.  






New Jersey Island.  Additional observations that may have a 
bearing on the failure of the New Jersey Island are 
summarized below.  The numbering system used to identify 
specific sheetpiles that are discussed in this section is shown 
in Fig. 3. 
 
 The failure appears essentially symmetrical when 
viewed in plan. Ruptured sheetpiles in Cells A and B 
are interior section MP-101 sheetpiles located under 
the North-South grade beam.  Torch-cut holes, 
presumably for handling, were found on several 
sheetpiles near the failure zone between EI. +1.0 and 
+2.0 ft USC&GS datum. 
 
 Cell A has 95 exterior section MP-102 sheetpiles. 
Other cells on both islands have 97 exterior section 
MP-102 sheetpiles, as called for in the construction 
drawings.  The number of interior sheetpiles in the 
cells was not determined as the tops of the sheetpiles 
were covered with fill. 
 
 Sheetpile 5 of the AB connecting arc is not 
embedded, and is only 47 1/8 inches in length.  The 
tip elevation of this sheetpile is at EI.-32.7 ft. Based 
on borings made in 1959 the mudline was at 
approximate EI. -30.0 ft in this area.  Therefore this 
sheetpile had insufficient embedment at the time of 
construction.  The divers felt two sheetpiles that were 
present inside the connecting arc behind the short 
sheetpile. However, the two sheetpiles are not 
connected to the cell and they would not compensate 
for the lack of embedment of the short sheet pile.  
Sheetpile 4 of Cell A has a short length of sheetpile 
driven in front of it. 
 
 A large mound of clay and gravel is located in front 
of the AB closure arc. The mound is highest in front 
of sheetpiles 4 and 5, where the greatest lateral 
movement of the cells occurred.  The divers 
estimated that the crest of the mound is 
approximately 12 ft above the adjacent scoured 
bottom of the riverbed. 
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 The sheetpiles on the New Jersey Island were to be 
spliced by butt welding to attain the required length. 
In Cell A, exterior sheetpile 95 and interior sheetpile 
3N did not show evidence of ever having been 
welded, and there was a 1 inch gap between the two 
lengths comprising sheetpile 95. 
 
 There were no weep holes in the structure to allow 
drainage of the cells. 
 
 Angle plates of both connecting tees of the AB 
closure arc were torn (Fig. 11).  
 
As a result of the partial collapse, the two badly damaged 
connecting tees which connected Cell A and Cell B were 
distorted and appeared to be gradually tearing apart, making 
the structure of doubtful value.  If the two tee connections 
were to completely separate, the large radius arc formed by 
failed cells A and B would be lost, and the cell fill would be 
free to move into the river.  It would be more difficult to 
salvage and repair the island. We did not want to lose what we 
had and there was a good chance that we could.  To arrest the 
progressive worsening of the tee connections, our expert 
consultant, Mr. E. Paul Swatek, recommended that we 
immediately carry out the modest temporary repairs described 
below: 
 
 In order to equalize the water inside the cells with the 
level of the river, burn weep holes in the sheetpiles of 
all four Cells A, B, C, and D above the water line on 
the more or less vertical portions of the sheetpiles.   
After burning of these drain holes, they should be 
rodded to develop a stream of water.  To do this take 
a welding rod and churn it around in the hole.  The 
rodding would dislodge any large round stone which 
might plug the hole, and develop a crude filter behind 
the sheetpile.  This may have to be done several times 
before a good weep is developed. 
 
 Weld horizontal steel straps, 4" x 1/2" at 8" centers 
vertically, across the tee-pile splits - all the way 
across both splits. Form to fit sheetpile cell radius.   
Weld these straps at 8 inch centers from the top of 
split down to low water, using a low hydrogen 
welding rod because of sheetpile chemistry. 
 
Pennsylvania Island.  A sinkhole located in the NE cell of the 
Pennsylvania Island developed prior to the preliminary site 
inspection. The sinkhole was adjacent to the exterior 
sheetpiles and semicircular in shape, approximately 13'-3" 
long, 7'-8" at its widest point and 8'-4" at its deepest point.  
The sinkhole spanned the 13th, and 23rd sheetpiles of Cell D. 
During the underwater inspection of the area corresponding to 
the surface sinkhole, the divers observed that the tips of six 
sheetpiles (Nos. 16, 18, 20, 22, 24 and 26) were 4 inches to 9 
inches above the mudline.  Active loss of fill was occurring in 
several openings whereas the presence of cobbles and gravel 





Hydrographic surveys were carried out in order to investigate 
general river bottom con conditions in the vicinity of the two 
islands and to document scour near the structures.  Depth 
soundings taken by the Corps of Engineers in 1954 and 
riverbed elevations from the 1959 borings were compared 
with 1991 soundings.  Soundings were not available for the 
period immediately before or after construction. Based on the 
comparison, approximately 20 ft of scour had occurred on the 
channel side of both islands. 
 
The maximum depth of scour in the vicinity of the New Jersey 
Island is on the channel side of Cell B. The riverbed elevation 
at the deepest point is at approximately El. -49.9 ft.  The 
riverbed elevation on the channel side of the island in 1959 
was approximately El. -30.0 ft. On the Pennsylvania Island the 
deepest scour is also on the channel side, at approximately El. 
-39.3 ft, compared to El. -20.5 ft, in 1954. 
 
 
Evaluation of Cathodic Protection 
 
Corrosion Probe, Inc. performed ultrasonic thickness testing of 
the sheetpiles and evaluated the condition of the cathodic 
protection system.  The cathodic protection system on the 
New Jersey Island was not operational.  An overload trip 
feature probably deactivated the system when the cables from 
the H-pile groups to the anodes in the two failed cells were 
ruptured due to the large displacements of the cell fill. 
Potential measurements indicate that all structures on the New 
Jersey Island, including the sheetpiles, H-piles, pile caps and 
electrical grounds were electrically continuous.  This appears 
to corroborate calculations and oral recollections which 
indicated that the batter H-piles on that island intersected the 
sheetpile cells, as shown on Fig. 2.  The cathodic protection 




Metallurgical Analysis and Failure Mechanism 
 
Steel coupons from the failed cells were torch cut from 
sheetpiles in the failure zone and analyzed in PECo's 
Metallurgy Laboratory.  The principal conclusions of the 
metallurgical analysis regarding the failure mechanism are 
paraphrased below: 
 
 Fracture of the interlock of the ruptured panel in Cell 
B started beneath the soil surface and progressed 
upward in a fast, brittle manner.  This was evidenced 
by the characteristic herringbone failure pattern 
observed on the rupture surface. 
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 Fracture of the interlock of the ruptured panel in Cell 
A initiated approximately 78 inches below the top of 
the sheetpile and progressed upward in a manner 
similar to the crack in Cell B. 
 
 The web of the sheetpile adjoining ruptured panel 
had a large crack.  This section exhibited a 
considerable amount of deformation due to twisting 
and tearing.  The initiation site of this crack was 
below the soil level and therefore not identified. 
 
 All of the cracks that were observed, including a 
small axial tear emanating from the bottom edge of a 
lifting hole, indicate a high tensile hoop stress being 
applied to the damaged cells. 
 
 The brittle nature of the cracks in the interlocks 
indicates either a high energy induced mode and/or 
cracking occurring at a temperature below the 
ductile-to-brittle transition temperature. 
 
 There was evidence that corrosion damage had 
degraded the sheetpiles sufficiently to influence the 
observed fractures. 
 
 Material analysis included spectrochemical analysis, 
tensile testing, impact testing, hardness testing and 
metallography.  The samples were determined to be 
carbon steel and their mechanical properties were 





PECO personnel surveyed the New Jersey Island to record the 
present configuration of the island.   A plan of the New Jersey 
Island before and after failure based on the survey data is 
presented in Fig. 3. 
  
 
Soils Laboratory Analyses 
 
Sieve analyses were performed on samples retrieved from the 
upper 8 ft of the failure surface.   Below this elevation, debris 
from the slide covers the existing soil profile.  The sieve 
analyses confirm visual observations that the upper 4½ ft of 
soil is granular material composed of gravelly sands, silty 
sands, and sand and gravel.  The granular material is underlain 
by a 1 foot thick layer of silty clay.  The underlying fill is 
gravel and sand. It is not known whether the soil samples are 
from fill that was placed at the time of construction or from 
fill that was added later.   Atterberg limits were performed on 
riverbed samples.   The New Jersey sample was obtained from 
the mound of soil in front of the failed cells.  This sample is 
highly plastic clay, with a liquid limit of 103% and plasticity 
index of 67%.   The Pennsylvania sample was obtained from 
the channel side of the riverbed.  This sample is also highly 




Analysis of Water Sample 
 
A water sample obtained from within the failed area was 
analyzed by ion chromatography and atomic absorption 
spectroscopy in PECO's Chemistry Branch.  The pH of the 
sample was 6.39, and chlorides were 39.3 ppm. This indicated 
that the river environment is not chemically aggressive, as 
evidenced by the good condition of the sheetpiles outside of 





In this section a hypothesis is developed which attempts to 
explain the probable cause(s) of failure of the New Jersey 
Island and describes the sequence of events that led to the 





The failure hypothesis was developed from findings of site 
visits, condition surveys, metallurgical testing, engineering 
analysis and reasonable engineering judgment.  A number of 
contributing factors suggest that a progression of events 
occurred over time, which eventually culminated in the failure 
of two of the four circular cells comprising the New Jersey 
Island.   Conclusions regarding the initiation of fracture at the 
toe or lower reach of the sheetpiling are necessarily inferred, 
because the failed condition of the structure below the existing 
mudline is not observable without the expense and risk of 
extracting the sheetpiles. 
 
 
Contributing Factors and Sequence of Events 
 
The following paragraphs describe the several factors that 
contributed to the failure.  The role of each of these factors in 
leading to the eventual failure mechanism constitutes a failure 
hypothesis.  The inferred sequence of events leading to failure 
is depicted in Fig. 8. 
 
1.  Scour and Loss of Sheetpile Embedment.  First, there was 
scour, probably over a long term.   Scour is the process of soil 
erosion in which soil particles are lifted, moved and 
transported by the force of flowing water.  Scour can be a 
gradual process or it can occur rapidly, depending on the 
velocity of water flow and the type and properties of the soil 
being eroded. Washing out or undermining of pier foundations 
due to scour of riverbeds is a common cause of bridge failures 
(Jumikis, 1971). 
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Fig. 8: Possible Sequence of Failure 
 
 
As mentioned, a hydrographic survey was conducted around 
both islands as part of the condition survey.  The hydrographic 
survey disclosed substantial depth of scour around the channel 
side of the New Jersey Island. Scour reached a depth 20 ft in 
the vicinity of Cell B.  Near Cell A the maximum depth of 
scour reached about 13 ft. However, the scoured depth before 
failure may have been even greater than these values.  The 
divers observed a mound of displaced river bottom soils in 
front of the failed, sloping sheeting, a consequence of soil 
displacement when the cells underwent a large movement 
toward the channel.  The eroded depth prior to failure was 
obscured by the material displaced by the movement of the 
cellular structure.   Nevertheless, the depth of scour reported 
in the hydrographic survey was substantial, and is believed to 
be the initiating factor of the failure.  Scour deepened the 
water along the channel side of Cell B which lowered the 
elevation of passive resistance on the outside of the cell and 
increased the net internal pressure, adding a significant 
amount of hoop tension at the interlocks.  With the loss of 
sheet pile embedment due to scour there is an increase in 
internal earth pressure and a corresponding increase in 
circumferential tensile stress in the webs andat the interlocks 
of the sheetpiles.  Without occurrence of scour the failure 
would not likely have occurred, in spite of any damage to the 





2.  Damage of Sheetpiles during Installation.  Driving records 
for the installation of the sheetpiling were not available. 
Therefore, the actual driving resistance encountered is not 
known.  However, in light of findings of other projects with 
similar subsurface conditions, it is reasonable to assume that 
the sheetpiles suffered some degree of damage during 
installation. 
 
The soil profile in Fig. 4 shows that the sheetpiles were driven 
through the soft riverbed silt into an underlying sand and 
gravel layer.  This layer is medium dense to dense and could 
have caused substantial resistance to penetration of the driven 
sheetpiles. In overcoming this resistance the sheetpiles, being 
long flexible members, were vulnerable to damage by tearing 
of the webs or deformation of the interlocks. 
 
The vulnerability of sheetpiles to damage during driving is 
supported by Jahren (1990) as follows: "For cell structures, 
many failures are due to construction problems, such as rough 
driving that damages interlocks of sheet piles”, by Bowles 
(1968): “To achieve a cell which is stable against bursting it is 
necessary that the sheetpiling be driven so that continuity of 
the interlocks is maintained.  Small stones in  the  driving  
zone may  wedge in  the  interlock  so  that the interlock joint 
can be damaged or the adjacent [sheet] pile may be driven out 
of position”, and by Koerner (1984): “splitting of the web 
during driving is not uncommon, particularly when 
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obstructions or dense granular soils are being penetrated.”  
Initially, sheetpiles and interlocks which may have been 
damaged at or near the toe during installation were well 
embedded below the river bottom.  Under this condition the 
internal earth pressure and resulting interlock stresses were 
small and of no consequence to the behavior of the cellular 
structure.  However, with the progression of scouring of the 
riverbed, the embedment of damaged sheetpiles and interlocks 
was gradually reduced and the circumferential tensile stresses 
increased accordingly. 
 
3.  Soft Sediments and Periodic Backfilling of Cells.  As 
mentioned under oral recollections, during the original 
construction attempts were made to dredge the soft river 
bottom sediments, but were apparently abandoned when new 
deposits occurred following a spring freshette.  Hence, it is 
believed that the cellular structure was constructed through the 
soft sediments and it appears that attempts to excavate the soft 
silty sediments from within the cells was not successful, prior 
to filling the cells with granular backfill.  The presence of the 
soft clay in the cell had the following undesirable effects on 
the structure: 
 
 Soft clays trapped at riverbed elevation and deep in 
Cell B added to hoop tension.  The intention was to 
remove these soft plastic river bottom sediments 
before placing the cell fill.  The considered opinion is 
that they were not. They are revealed in borings taken 
after the collapse. The excess pressures transmitted 
by these trapped plastic clays in Cell B produced 
interlock values in the neighborhood of 16 kips per 
inch, which is at or above the ultimate value of the 
M-l0l interlock. 
 
 Long term consolidation under the weight of the 
backfill led to compression, subsidence and surface 
settlement.  This is consistent with the history of 
sinkholes and depressions that have required 
backfilling to bring the ground level in the cells back 
to design grade. Of course, each time backfill is 
placed to correct the depressions, the added weight 
induces still more settlement and the need for 
subsequent additional backfill, which increases the 
stress even further. The periodic backfilling increased 
the overburden pressures in the cell and likewise the 
internal lateral pressure exerted outwardly on the 
sheetpiles.  This in turn increases the circumferential 
hoop stresses. 
 
 The location of the soft soils is down low in the cells 
and coincident with the zone where the maximum 
pressure arises. The soft sediments having a low 
shear strength (φ’ = 20º), even after some 
improvement due to the long term effect of 
consolidation, gives rise to a relatively high 
coefficient of lateral earth pressure (K = 0.8) such 
that 80% of the vertical overburden pressure is 
exerted laterally on the walls.  See Fig. 7.  Had the 
sediments been replaced with a granular material the 
lateral pressure and corresponding hoop stresses 
would be reduced, typically to around 50 to 60 % of 
the vertical stress. 
 
 Sheetpile steel has a low Charpy impact resistance, 
especially at lowered temperatures.  At some time 
during the previous winter or winters a defect such as 
noted cracks at a pulling hole or a notch at the top of 
a burned off sheetpile could enlarge, and lengthen the 
crack.  This would create a stress raiser for hoop 
tension stresses. 
 
 The failed sheetpile was at an interior location in cell 
B near a tee. The interlock and web stresses in tees 
and the sheets adjacent thereto have an increased 
indeterminate stress from the connecting arc in 
addition to the other sheets in the cell. 
 
4.  Differential Water Pressure.  The ground surface of each 
foundation island is exposed to climatological elements. 
Neither island is paved and during a heavy storm they readily 
admit rainwater, which could result in full saturation of the 
backfill.  Because the cell is relatively watertight, and the 
backfill material is not entirely free - draining, as disclosed by 
the gradation curves from the grain size sieve analyses, 
rainwater could accumulate until the cells are completely 
saturated.  There were no weep holes in the outside sheetpiles 
above water. Encrustation over time made a more or less 
watertight vessel of the cell. High storm tides with waves 
overtopping the sheetpiles would fill the cell.   During the tidal 
cycle at low tide, approximately 800 psf would be added to the 
internal pressure, increasing interlock tension by yet another 
significant amount.   
 
Full saturation would be more likely if the storm occurred 
during high tide.  Because of tidal lag, the differential head 
between the saturated ground line inside the cells. (El. 15) and 
the mean low water of the river outside the structure (El. -
2.16) would be about 17 ft or a differential water pressure of 
about 1,060 psf.  This hydrostatic pressure could cause almost 
3 kips per inch circumferential tensile stress within the cells 
below the water level of the river. 
 
5.  Increase of Internal Earth Pressure and Hoop Tensile 
Stress.  As scour proceeded, the embedment of the cell was 
reduced on the channel side.  This reduction in embedment 
served to increase the unsupported height of the structure, 
which then resulted in greater lateral earth pressure acting on 
the sheeting. Furthermore, this earth pressure is related to the 
square of the unsupported height.  Not only would the pressure 
increase but with the loss of embedment the location of the 
maximum earth pressure descended to a point lower in the 
cell, nearer to the locations where possible driving damage to 
the sheeting existed. 
 
6.  Excessive Circumferential Stress and Interlock Failures.  
As a result of the above mentioned contributing 
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circumstances, the circumferential tensile stresses increased to 
a level sufficient to overcome the strength of the interior 
sheetpiles in Cells A and B.  A recent reliability study of 
sheetpile cellular structures found that bursting is the most 
likely failure mode for cell structures that are designed 
according to the present state of the art (Jahren, 1990). 
 
The manufacturer's guaranteed ultimate strength of the 
interlocks for the sheeting used in this structure is 16 kips per 
inch.  At this value the interlocks are expected to overcome 
the contact friction, letting the joined sheetpiles separate from 
each other. The recommended allowable force is 8 or 9 kips 
per inch, maximum (Lacroix, Esrig and Lusher, 1970).  A 
stress analysis of Cell B shown in Fig. 9 was conducted to 
estimate the maximum hoop stress in the cell, which occurs on 
the interior sheets at or near the connecting arc (TVA, 1957), 
the depth to the maximum stress was assumed to correspond 
to the depth of scour outside Cell B.  This is based on 
Maitland and Schroeder (1979) who recommend a plane of 
fixity concept to estimate the location of maximum lateral 
earth pressure.  The weaker the soil in which a cell is 
embedded, the greater the depth to the plane of fixity. 
Therefore, the maximum interlock tension should be 
calculated at a lower level for weak soils compared to strong 
soils, and may even occur at or below the dredgeline. 
 
 
Fig. 9: Hoop Stress Analysis of Cell B 
 
The analysis arrived at an estimated circumferential tension of 
16.3 kips per inch under the conditions of scour, saturation of 
the backfill above MLW, and the presence of soft sediments 
inside the cell.  This value exceeds the allowable force (8 kips 
per inch) as well as the ultimate interlock strength of 16 kips 
per inch.  The corresponding stress is 43.5 ksi, which exceeds 
the yield point of 38.5 ksi.  The analysis demonstrates that the 
tension was sufficiently high to exceed the ultimate strength 
for separation of interlocks and the yield point of the webs on 
the interior sheetpiles.  
 
The cells were constructed in 1959 using MP-101 sheetpiles 
(web thickness = 3/8 inch) for the interior members and MP-
102 (web thickness = 1/2 inch) for the exterior members of the 
cells.  This may have been done to afford the exterior cells a 
longer life against corrosion.  In contrast, TVA identified the 
interior sheeting of cells as being more highly stressed than 
the exterior as a result of the added pulling effect on the main 
cells by the connecting arcs.  However, the TVA document 
containing this information was published in December 1957 
and may not have been widely disseminated by 1959.   Had 
the larger wall thickness also been employed on the interior 
members, perhaps the failure would not have occurred, 
although   continued   scour,  if   not  discovered,  would  have  
 
increased tension stresses in the future, possibly sufficient to 
cause failure.  Although the computed values are based on the 
maximum depth of scour (about 20 ft), and therefore may be a 
slight overestimate, it should be clear that the interior of the 
cells, and to a lesser degree the connecting arcs and exterior 
members, were experiencing a condition of substantial 
distress, sufficient to initiate shear tearing of preexisting 
damaged webs and/or brittle fracture of the interlocks.  This 
was consistent with the physical evidence, above the mudline. 
 
The major principal stress in a cell is circumferential tension 
(or hoop stress) and tends to pull the interlocks apart. 
However, cellular structures frequently exhibit a non-ductile 
or brittle mode of failure at stresses far below the yield 
strength.  Brittle fractures are usually associated with flaws 
(i.e. damaged sheetpiles, torch-cut hole, etc.), are often 
sudden, and usually occur without warning.  The absence of 
gross plastic deformation distinguishes brittle fractures that 
occur below the yield point from ductile failure.  Low 
temperatures can cause a normally ductile material to behave 
in a brittle manner. Since the failure was noted sometime 
between December, 1990 and April 1991, low temperature 
could have been another influencing factor in initiating a 
brittle mode of failure. 
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In the majority of interlock failures the contact friction 
between the interlocking fingers and thumbs holding adjacent 
sheetpiles together is overcome by circumferential stress and 
separate entirely one sheetpile from the other.  However, this 
mode of failure was not evident at the New Jersey Island. 
Instead the failure mechanism consisted of the steel fracturing 
vertically through the narrowest dimension (root) of an 
interlocking thumb, leaving it behind and inside the thumb and 
finger of the other interlock.  That is, the steel fractured before 




Fig. 10: Brittle Fracture through Interlock 
 
The fracture occurred along a vertical plane.  Chevron or 
herringbone markings pointed downward, an indication that 




Summary of Failure Mode 
 
Considering the high calculated stresses, the potential for 
damage to the webs (tearing) and interlocks during 
installation, as well as other random local stress raisers 
observed by the divers, such as torch-cut holes and perhaps 
unseen welds below ground, the brittle fracture failure 
mechanism at or below yield point is a consequence 
compatible with the several contributing factors and the 
interactive scenario described herein.  
 
With the maximum depth of scour in front of Cell B, a large 
pulling force was exerted on the connecting arc AB, which in 
turn pulled on the interior sheetpiles until Cell B was breached 
in its lower reaches.  The lack of redundancy in this type of 
structure permitted the crack to propagate upward, as 
evidenced by the downward pointing chevron pattern on the 
exposed fracture surface.  As Cell B was then free to lurch 
toward the channel, it pulled on Cell A through connecting arc 
AB.  This additional stress, added to an already severely 
stressed Cell A (13 ft of scour), was sufficient to initiate a 
fracture of Cell A several feet below the top of the sheeting, 
which at this location had already been cut down several feet 
below grade to permit construction of the tie beam. 
 
As the two cells failed behind the connecting arc they lurched 
outward trying to individually open up, but were restrained by 
their mutual connecting arc, as evidenced by the distortion and 
slight pulling apart of the T-connection from the top of the 
sheeting to a point several feet down (Fig. 11).  This latter 




Fig. 11: Connecting Arc A-B in Distress 
 
Other possible causes of failure such as bearing capacity, 
corrosion and vessel impact were considered, but were ruled 
out.  The origin of the split was not examined because it was 
located at a deep elevation in the cell and could not be easily 
recovered.  Therefore, consultant Paul Swatek indicated the 
possibility that a ductile necked down section of interlocking 
thumbs might have initiated failure, say due to steel with slag 
inclusions, at a point of high tensile stress.  But having said 
that, he reported that he had seen and heard of many brittle 
fractures of sheetpiles, including webs, fingers, and thumbs. 
The steel in sheetpiles is subject to brittle fracture at reduced 
stress and this failure was one of that kind.  The following is 
an excerpt from E.P. Swatek’s report (1991): 
 
There was no single event or blow which caused the 
failure, rather it was the accumulation of scour, 
resulting overloads and weaknesses which finally 
produced the failure.  It has been shown that the 
interlock stress was in the order of 16 kips per inch, 
near or above the ultimate strength of the interlock 
and/or the web.  Although sheetpile interlocks are 
tested and guaranteed to a value of 16 kips per 
inch, the guarantee could be meaningless. [In E.P. 
Swatek’s experience he had knowledge of tests on 
some sheetpiles delivered from the mills that found 
values well below the guarantee.] That is why a 
factor of safety of two is used, resulting in an 
allowable design stress of 8 kips per inch. 
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Two interlocks failed. The first was an interior M-
10l near a tee connector in cell B.   The failure was 
a classic brittle fracture which left telltale chevrons 
in the fracture surface, indicating it progressed 
upward from a point of origin deep in the cell.   
This is consistent with the suspected high failure 
tensile stress alluded to.  
 
The second failure was in cell A in a position more 
or less symmetrical to that in cell B.  The second 
fracture was not a clean brittle cleavage as in the 
first, but showed signs of distortion & tearing.  This 
suggests the following scenario.  The first failure in 
cell B resulted in movement and distortion of the 
fragments of cell B. Collapse of Cell B was rapid 
and put an overload in cell A sufficient to cause the 
second rupture.  That this second rupture showed 
tearing and distortion of Cell A sheetpiles places 
these events subsequent to the failure in Cell B.  
The first failure (Cell B) was rather explosive and 
instantaneous. The second failure (Cell A) must 
have followed shortly thereafter. 
 
There is another weakness in the sheetpile cells that 
is seldom given attention in the design.  This is the 
web stress in the net area of the row of rivet holes 
of the tee connector.  Assuming an interlock stress 
of 15,700 kips per inch at the time of failure, the 
stress in the net area of the web of the tee connector 
would be approximately 60,000 psi.  This elevated 
stress plus the flexure stress in the web of the tee 
connector are reason enough to suggest that it is 
not inconceivable to imagine the origin of failure in 
the tee connector with the split crossing over 




ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF REHABILITATION 
 
Several concepts were explored for restoring the foundation 
islands to a safe long-term condition.  The restoration plan 
included remediation of the failed New Jersey Island, the 
Pennsylvania Island sinkhole, and protection of the severely 
pitted zone around both islands. Placing a large diameter cell 
or steel structure encircling the entire island was not practical 
from design or economy.  Other alternatives were deemed not 
viable. For the sake of brevity, only the recommended 
alternatives will be discussed. 
 
 
New Jersey Island 
 
The failed area had to be backfilled because of the hazard it 
presented to public safety.  This island is located in a public 
waterway and was accessible to the public from two stationary 
ladders.  Members of the public could climb onto the island, 
and through their own actions, injure themselves for example, 
by falling from the exposed grade beam.  Unless the structure 
was stabilized the possibility of movements of the cells could 
also present a safety hazard to boaters who might be near the 
structure at the time of additional failure.  The integrity of the 
structure could be jeopardized since the cathodic protection 
system was no longer providing corrosion protection to the H-
piles supporting the tower, and these piles were now partially 
exposed to the atmosphere.  Future fill movements could 
damage the coating on the piles and expose a longer portion of 
the H-piles to the atmosphere. 
 
Since Cells A and B were no longer closed systems, much of 
the tension in the sheetpiles along the failed portion was taken 
by soil friction in the intact portion of the cells and possibly 
through the connecting arcs of cells C and D.  Backfilling 
would create additional instability which could lead to 
additional fill movements in cells A and B and possibly 
progressive failure of all cells. 
 
Therefore, it was agreed that the sinkhole in the failed area 
would be backfilled with lightweight granular material, the 
cathodic protection system would be repaired, and a buttress 
of crushed stone armored with riprap would be placed around 
the island to stabilize the failed structure in-place and provide 
a protection blanket against scour.  These measures would 
prevent further movement and potential loss of the fill into the 
Delaware River. 
 
Use of lightweight fill would minimize lateral loads on the 
buttress.  A buttress of considerable width might be required. 
However, the structure is located outside of the navigation 
channel defined by the Corps of Engineers, and did not have 
an impact on the navigation channel. 
 
This alternative is relatively simple to construct because it 
does not require a structural connection to be made between 
the existing cells and the rock buttress.  This alternative would 
be built from the water and the existing structure would not 
interfere with construction. 
 
Periodically, bathymetric surveys would be performed to 
detect scour and the cathodic protection system would be 
tested. 
 
Initially, it was thought that the soft sediments in the existing 
riverbed would not provide an adequate foundation for the 
buttress and would have to be removed by dredging to allow 
the buttress to rest on underlying bedrock. But dredging could 
result in destabilizing the state of quasi-equilibrium the cells 
had reached.  Dredging would also require disposal of the 
sediments.  Alternatively, cyclopean riprap was considered in 
order to displace the soft soil, but it was rejected because it 
was questionable whether the large rocks could actually 
displace the soft sediments. 
 
Fortunately, in-house laboratory testing for soil shear strength 
and compressibility indicated that the soft sediments were 
somewhat more favorable than previously thought.  Slope 
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stability studies using the laboratory strength values confirmed 
that in lieu of excavating the varved clay to bedrock, a large 
perimeter buttress could safely rest on the varved clays.  This 
design modification resulted in a $3 million savings and 
reduced permitting and construction time. 
 
To avoid additional differential surcharging and displacement 
of the island backfill outwardly against the circular ring of 
sheetpiles, placing the fill would be sequenced such that the 
elevation of the buttress was always a few feet higher than the 
backfill placed inside the failed cells.  Once the buttress was 
fully in-place, the backfill could be topped - out. 
 
In placing the buttress, care had to be taken to avoid 
increasing the surcharge and hoop tension in the failed island 
sheets that had been repaired with the steel straps.  The straps 
could take some hoop load but were considered only a stop-
gap measure - an attempt to maintain what we had. In no way 
were the straps a permanent solution.  The full and permanent 
confinement/stability of the island awaited placement of the 
buttress. 
 
Thus, a rock buttress was recommended to stabilize the failure 
by placing a crushed stone buttress around the failed island to 
prevent further movement and potential loss of the fill into the 
Delaware River. The overburden would be removed to allow 
the buttress to rest on underlying bedrock.  However, in-house 
laboratory testing for soil strength and compressibility 
followed by slope stability studies confirmed that in lieu of 
excavating the silt/clay to bedrock, the large perimeter buttress 
could safely rest on the silt/clay.  This is to be preferred over 
dredging out the clays and disposing of a large volume of 
spoil. 
 
Paul Swatek recommended that the minimum berm around the 
undamaged side of the New Jersey Island be 15 ft thick and 30 
ft wide at the top, and be of the same crushed rock and riprap 
protection.  Thus, with the exception for a small inlet for a 
boat to access the island, there would be a buttress completely 
around the New Jersey Island. 
 
However, the toe of the buttress at the level of the riverbed 
would pass very closely to the buried location of two 20-inch 
and one 6-inch diameter natural gas pipelines.  Finite element 
analysis indicated a potential for vertical and horizontal 
movements of about 1 to 2 inches.  It was expected that the 
flexibility of the pipelines would tolerate the predicted 
movements.  Nevertheless, a geotechnical instrumentation 
program, comprised of settlement plates, inclinometers and 
piezometers, was implemented to monitor vertical and lateral 
movements and subsurface pore pressures in the vicinity of the 
proposed toe of slope, in order to determine whether the actual 
movements of the pipelines would exceed the predicted 




A sinkhole on the Pennsylvania Island was actively losing fill. 
Additional loss of fill could cause a redistribution of stresses 
in the affected sheetpile cell and lead to instability of the cell. 
Accordingly, temporary remedial work was performed in this 
area.  A small berm comprised of grout-filled burlap bags was 
constructed underwater by LRA. Steel plates (1/4 inch thick, 
14 inches wide and 20 inches long) were inserted in front of 
each of the six sheetpiles that were not embedded.  Grout-
filled burlap bags were placed in an interlocking and 
overlapping pattern to form the berm.  About 2 cubic yards of 
grout were placed. Sharpened 18- inch long, No. 4 reinforcing 
bars were driven through the layered bags (30 bags total) to 
pin them down.  This grout berm is considered a temporary 
solution which is subject to scour. 
 
The sinkhole would be filled with 3" to 6" stone.  This way, if 
future scour ever exposes the tips of the unembedded sheets, 
the stone will tend to choke off further loss.  A berm against 
this cell at the sinkhole can be placed 10 ft thick with a top 
that is 15 ft wide out from the cell. This berm should be of 
coarse stone, protected with riprap. 
 
Because scour had played a major role in the failure of the 
New Jersey Island, and the condition survey indicated that 
approximately 20 ft of scour occurred on the channel side of 
both islands, it would be prudent to provide permanent scour 
protection to the Pennsylvania Island to maintain adequate 
embedment of the sheetpiles.  The long term performance of 
the structure could be jeopardized unless repairs were made. 
 
Therefore, a buttress of crushed stone armored with riprap 
would be placed locally in the vicinity of the sinkhole to 
stabilize the structure and provide protection against scour.  A 
riprap scour protection blanket would be placed and the 
sinkhole would be backfilled.  Periodic bathymetric surveys 
would be performed to detect scour.  This alternative is 
relatively simple to construct because the sinkhole is still 
localized and the cell walls are still vertical.  The buttress did 
not impact navigation because the Pennsylvania Island is well 
outside of the navigation channel.  Construction of scour 
protection would lower the risk of a cell failure similar to that 
experienced on the New Jersey Island.  Construction, if done 
concurrently with the restoration of the New Jersey Island, 
would involve lower mobilization costs than if it is performed 
separately. 
 
Based on the above evaluations a large island-encompassing 
rock buttress was recommended for the New Jersey Island 
(Fig. 12) and a small localized rock buttress for the 
Pennsylvania Island.  The buttress is shown under construction 
in Figs. 13, 14 and 15. 
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Fig. 12: Proposed Buttress of Crushed Stone and Riprap 
 
 
It is likely that storm tides also inundated the Pennsylvania 
Island, causing internal water head and an increase in the 
interlock stress.  Interlock stress computations revealed that 
without drainage the interlock stress was a possible 14.5 kips 
per inch, with a factor of safety of 1.1, whereas with effective 
drainage these figures come down to 10.5 kips per inch wth a 
factor of safety of 1.5.  We try for a factor of safety of 2.0.  
Also, the stress in the net area along the row of rivet holes at 3 
inch centers in the main sheetpile web of the tees on the 
Pennsylvania  Island  reduced  from  a  possible  54,600  psi to 
 
 
38,600 psi, still a high figure.   In figuring maximum interlock 
values of the repaired island it is recommended that the 
envelope of the maximum 10 ft of the values be averaged over 
the 10 ft to recognize redistribution of stresses. 
 














Fig. 15: Failed Area with Lightweight Backfill, Geotextile, 




Repair of the Severely Pitted Tidal Splash Zone 
 
For both islands, the initial reaction to seeing the severely 
pitted steel sheetpiles in the splash zone was to restore the full 
sheetpile section and/or protect the area from further 
corrosion.  Measures were considered to restore the steel 
sections to full structural thickness, such as encasing the pitted 
zone with welded steel plates or by forming a 4 ft concrete 
belt doweled into the existing cells.   Divers attempted to 
apply protective coatings to create a moisture barrier to inhibit 
corrosion of the sheetpiles, but found this very difficult to 
achieve.  However, calculations indicated an internal lateral 
pressure of only 900 psf at this elevation.  Assuming a loss of 
one-third of the 3/8" thickness of the web of the sheetpile due 
to pitting, the web stress computed to only 13,300 psi, 
sufficiently low that it was agreed that the concrete ring need 
not be implemented. It was decided to specify a 4-foot epoxy 
coating around the tidal zone.  Even if the steel in the tidal 






Since the repairs to the New Jersey Island were carried out 
effectively, given periodic inspection and maintenance, the 
island is expected to be stable for a long time. 
 
At the Pennsylvania Island, the original 60-foot length of 
sheetpiles was set too short.  Scour on both islands over the 
years was about the same, namely 20 ft.  The sinkholes at the 
Pennsylvania Island indicated that scour was undermining the 
sheetpile perimeter of the island.  Future scour may attack at 
some point other than where the repairs were made.  
Therefore, annual scour surveys should be conducted to 
monitor scour.  If scour increases, repairs may have to be 
undertaken in the form of a low permanent berm around the 
island.   New sinkholes would also warn of scour. 
 
Drainage through the weep holes should be kept permanent. It 
would be well to observe this drainage and make sure it is 
maintained.  Periodic rodding of the holes may be required. 
Drainage is a necessity for both islands to keep interlock 





The collapse of Cells A and B of the New Jersey Island due to 
scour was not a unique occurrence.  Scour is a common geo-
hazard around structures in waterways.  Even well planned 
scour protection may be subject to undermining. The 
occurrence of scour may be silent, and requires proactive 
diligent monitoring, including periodic underwater inspection 
and hydrographic measurements. 
 
The findings of this investigation have implications for the 
successful performance of other cellular structures.  It is 
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recommend that this case-history be disseminated and that a 
program of inspection, assessment, rating, maintenance, and 
effective early repair of the condition of similar structures 
subject to scour be established for the purpose of preventing 
future failures. 
 
The following quotation was a warning from White and 
Prentis (1950), which is as true today as it was then, ten years 
before these Delaware River transmission structures were 
constructed, and makes a fitting end to this paper: 
 
An inherent weakness of the cellular type of 
cofferdam is that if even one pile or interlock fails the 
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